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Introduction
When the Telecommunications Act of 19961 was signed into law,
supporters proclaimed it would revolutionize the $200 billion a year
telecommunications industry and put Americans at the threshold of the
information super-highway of the 21 st century.2 Three years later, the Act
has generated more controversy than progress. Among other things, there
has been a Supreme Court challenge to the authority of the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") to set the prices
at which local exchange companies must lease their networks to new
entrants; 3 a federal court decision that the Act's restrictions on Bell
Operating Companies create an unconstitutional "bill of attainder" (a
t PM Industrial Economics, Inc., San Francisco, CA.
tt John Michael Stuart Professor of Economics, University of Texas at Austin.
ttt PM Industrial Economics, Inc. We would like to thank Paul MacAvoy for careful reading
and most helpful comments. The paper is in memory of Ken Dunmore who introduced us to access
pricing issues in local telephony.
I Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of
1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, at 16,243-53 (1996) (first report and order) (statements of FCC
Commissioners James H. Quello and Susan Ness).
3 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. 3d., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
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decision overturned on appeal); 4 and repeated FCC and U.S. Department
of Justice denials of Bell Operating Company petitions to enter in-region,
long-distance markets under section 271 of the Act.'
The Act requires incumbent local exchange companies to provide
"nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis" to
competitors.6 This provision of unbundled network elements (UNEs) is
intended to allow competing local providers to assemble services, using
some or all of the incumbent's facilities, purchasing them in an 2i la carte
fashion.7 How to set the prices paid by competitive local exchange carriers
for the UNEs of local exchange carriers has become perhaps the most
contentious issue arising under the Act.
Throughout the debate, two primary pricing methods have been
advocated: (1) the uniform, total element long-run incremental cost
(TELRIC) approach, which is currently favored by the FCC and many
state regulatory agencies, and (2) the efficient component pricing rule
(ECPR). The TELRIC approach sets the price of an UNE equal to its
direct, forward-looking cost (both capital and operating). The ECPR
approach, by contrast, sets the price equal to (1) the incremental cost of an
UNE plus (2) the incumbent's opportunity cost of providing the UNE to a
competitor. This opportunity cost, in turn, equals the amount that the
incumbent would have earned had it sold retail services using the
unbundled network element.'
4 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd, 154
F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
5 See. e.g., Application of BellSouth Corp., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., & BellSouth Long
Distance, Inc., for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in La., 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599 (1998)
(memorandum order and opinion); Application of Ameritech Mich. Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Mich., 12
F.C.C.R. 20,543 (1997) (memorandum order and opinion); Evaluation of the United States Department
of Justice, Application of SBC Communications Inc. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecomms. Act
of 1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. In the State of Okla., No.97-121(F.C.C. May 16,
1997) (visited Apr. 21, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/sec271/sbc/afdvtO3.htm>;
Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, Application by BellSouth Corp., BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., & BellSouth Long Distance, Inc. for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in
S.C., No. 97-208 (F.C.C. Nov. 4, 1997) (visited Apr. 21, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/sec27 I/bellsouth/1262.htm>.
6 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). "Elements" are the discrete network facilities that must work in
concert to provide a "service." For example, in order to provide basic local telephone service to a
residential end user, many elements of the local network come into play and can include the following:
the local loop (typically, the twisted pair of copper wires connecting the end user's premises to the
local exchange company's central office switch); the port, which connects the loop to the switch and
generates dial tone for the line; the switching and routing performed by the switch hardware and
software; specialized local network databases; network signaling facilities, which are separate from the
circuits employed to carry voice; and the interoffice transmission facilities that connect a number of
these elements to one another. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(45) (Supp. 111996).
7 According to the statute, an "incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in
order to provide ... telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
8 For example, if the incumbent's incremental cost of providing a loop to a business
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In a recent article in this Journal, Professor William Baumol presents
a methodology for establishing competitively neutral prices for accessing
the network elements of a bottleneck facility, such as the unbundled loops
of a local exchange carrier.9 As Professor Baumol notes, pricing access to
bottleneck facilities is a matter of great urgency, having widespread
application in such network industries as electric, gas, rail, and
telecommunications, both in the United States and overseas.' ° The system
of non-uniform or differential access prices he recommends is an extension
of the ECPR methodology, with due allowance for the possibility that
cross subsidies in the retail rate structure may require access prices below
incremental cost. We agree with Professor Baumol's pricing
recommendation. Indeed, we have made the same recommendation
previously in arbitration proceedings under the Act." In those proceedings,
however, state utility commissions frequently relied on an earlier affidavit
co-authored by Professor Baumol, in which he stated that "the appropriate
forward-looking benchmark for pricing [UNEs] is total service long run
incremental cost, or TSLRIC."' 2 After much debate and litigation, state
customer is $30, its retail business rate is $60, and the incumbent's cost of inputs the competitor will
supply (for example, retailing costs avoided by the incumbent when making the loop available for
resale) is $5, then the ECPR methodology sets a price of a business loop UNE equal to [$30 + ($60 -
$30 - $5)], or $55. ECPR prices can also be calculated using an alternative, "top-down" approach-
that is, by subtracting the cost of competitively supplied inputs from the incumbent's retail price for
the input. Under this approach, the ECPR price would be $60 - $5 = $55 for the example business
loop. Note that the "top-down" approach yields the same result as the "bottom-up" approach.
9 See William J. Baumol, Having Your Cake: How to Preserve Universal-Service Cross
Subsidies While Facilitating Competitive Entry, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1999). Some unbundled
network elements (such as switching) are comparatively easy for competitors to provide themselves,
while others (such as the local loop) may be more difficult to duplicate. Professor Baumol identifies
the latter type as "bottleneck" facilities or elements, as access to them must generally be secured from
the incumbent local carrier. See id. at 3.
10 See id. at 4-6.
11 See Michael J. Doane et al., An Economic Framework for Implementing the Pricing
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, at IV-1 to IV-12 (1996) (unpublished manuscript
filed on behalf of GTE Corporation before state commissions pursuant to the arbitration provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
12 See Affidavit of William J. Baumol, Janusz A. Ordover, and Robert D. Willig 3, at 2,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R.
15,499 (1996) (No. 96-98). Following both the filing of this affidavit and the release of the FCC's First
Report and Order, it became industry practice to use the term "TSLRIC" to refer to the long-run
incremental cost of a service and "TELRIC" to refer to the long-run incremental cost of a particular
network element. Unfortunately, there has been some laxity in the use of these terms in
telecommunications fora, so that the older and more familiar "TSLRIC" is sometimes mistakenly
employed in discussions of element access pricing. The reader should not be confused by this
inconsistency but should instead focus upon the fact that a total long-run incremental cost pricing
methodology is being applied. The concept behind TELRIC is the same as that of TSLRIC but is
specific to a particular network element.
To determine the incremental cost to an incumbent of providing a service, one must look at the
change in total cost to the firm resulting from a decision not to provide the service; in other words, the
difference between total cost to the firm when the service is provided and the total cost if the service is
not provided equals the portion of total costs attributable to the particular service. To illustrate this
notion, assume a simple case in which a firm provides two services, A and B. The incremental cost (IC)
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public utilities commissions have overwhelmingly adopted the TELRIC
approach in interim proceedings.1
3
The purpose of this Response is not to focus on Professor Baumol's
(welcome) change in position, but rather to assist policymakers in
understanding the subtleties of access pricing. In particular, we intend to
highlight the substantial deficiencies of the TELRIC approach when used
to price local telephone network elements for the transition to a more
competitive environment. State commissions throughout the United States
are now in the process of establishing "permanent" prices for UNEs.14
(Telecommunications Act arbitration proceedings generally produced only
"interim" prices.) 5 Unfortunately, Professor Baumol's prior affidavit, in
our opinion, created some confusion over and was a factor in commission
decisions to adopt TELRIC pricing in favor of ECPR. 'But as Professor
Baumol's recent article in this Journal makes clear, when cross subsidies
or other forms of discrimination exist in the retail rate structure, a uniform
access price such as TELRIC cannot be competitively neutral.' 6 Indeed,
the application of TELRIC pricing in an environment characterized by
such retail price discrimination (as is the current rate structure for local
exchange telephony) is likely to promote inefficient market behavior. This
Response demonstrates these points and further proves that in a
comparison of TELRIC pricing versus what we refer to as the Market-
Determined Efficient Component Pricing Rule (M-ECPR). M-ECPR is far
superior to TELRIC in terms of allocative and productive efficiency.' 7 We
believe this latter finding has not been recognized by regulatory
of service A is equal to the change in total cost (TC) resulting from a decision to provide only B instead
of both A and B: IC(A) = ATC = TC(A,B) - TC(OB). Since total cost when only B is supplied is equal
to the stand-alone cost (SAC) of B, the incremental cost of A can also be expressed as: IC(A) =
TC(AB) - SAC(B). Similarly, IC(B) = TC(AB) - SAC(A). If the total cost of providing A and B
together is less than the sum of the incremental cost of A and B individually, then TC(A.B) < SAC(A) +
SAC(B), and the firm realizes efficiencies from supplying both A and B together. With regard to the
incremental cost of network elements, the same concept applies.
13 See, e.g., Sprint Communications Co., No. 96-0375, 1997 WL 56,906, at *6 (Haw. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n Jan. 17, 1997).
14 See. e.g., Unbundled Network Elements, No. P-100 Sub 133d, 1998 WL 995837 (N.C.
Utils. Comm'n Dec. 10, 1998) (order adopting permanent prices for unbundled network elements). In
addition, many state commissions are now holding similar proceedings in the electric and natural gas
industries to determine the pricing of distribution-related services. See, e.g., Restructuring of the
Emerging Competitive Natural Gas Mkt., No. 93-G-0932, 1994 WL 758686 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Dec: 20, 1994); New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Policy Statement Concerning the Future ofthe Natural
Gas Industry in New York State and Order Terminating Capacity Assignment (last modified Nov. 3,
1998) <http://www.dps.state.ny.us/fileroomhtm/doc4962.htm>.
15 See, e.g., Local Exch. & Local Exch. Access Telecomms. Competition, No. P-100 Sub
133, 1996 WL 130775 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n Feb. 23, 1996).
16 See Baumol, supra note 9, at 1I.
17 As explained in Part II, infra, there are crucial differences between ECPR and M-ECPR.
See also David S. Sibley et al., Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input (Dec. 28, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
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agencies.
I. The Road to Competitively Neutral Access Prices
A. Background on the Debate over Access Pricing
After President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act into law
on February 8, 1996, the FCC initiated proceedings to implement its
provisions. On April 19 of that year, the Commission released a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) that described its preliminary positions on
a wide range of issues raised by the Act, one of the most important being
the establishment of prices for UNEs under section 252(d)(1) of the
statute. 9 In the NOPR, the Commission stated that it "tentatively
conclude[d] that use of ECPR or equivalent methodologies to set prices for
interconnection and unbundled network elements would be inconsistent
with the section 252(d)(1) requirement that [prices] be based on 'cost."' 2
As we have demonstrated elsewhere,2 ' the Commission's rationale was
based on a complete misunderstanding of ECPR. In particular, the FCC
failed to recognize that the presence of market alternatives would, in some
instances, reduce an incumbent's opportunity costs, thus necessitating a
reduction in UNE prices.22
In response to the NOPR, Professor Baumol wrote an affidavit (with
Professors Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig) on behalf of AT&T in
which he argued that ECPR pricing was inappropriate for the local
telecommunications industry:
18 In Iowa Utilities Board the Supreme Court reversed the Eigth Circuit and held the FCC
has the authority to set pricing principles. However, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of
TELRIC pricing. Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S.Ct. 721, 728 n.3 (1999) ("Incumbents
argued.., that [TELRIC] was unreasonable because it stranded their historic costs and underestimated
the actual costs of providing interconnection and unbundled access. The Eighth Circuit did not reach
this issue, and the merits of TELRIC are not before us.").
19 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996,
I1 F.C.C.R. 14,171, 8, at 14,176, 117-156, at 14,209-25 (1996) [hereinafter NOPR] (notice of
proposed rulemaking). Section 252(d)(1) of the Act states in relevant part that UNE charges "(A) shall
be (i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-based proceeding) of providing the
interconnection or network element (whichever is applicable), and (ii) nondiscriminatory, and (B) may
include a reasonable profit." 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (Supp. 111996).
20 NOPR, supra note 19, 148, at 14,222.
21 SeeDoaneetal.,supranote 11, at 111-11, IV-4 to IV-12.
22 The pricing rule that takes into account such market alternatives is the M-ECPR. See
infra Part I11; see also Doane et al., supra note 1I, at IV-l to IV-12 (providing a description of how M-
ECPR can be used to establish unbundled network element prices). This rule, in addition to reducing
access prices in the presence of market alternatives, involves the use of a competitively neutral
surcharge that is required to ensure that the incumbent can satisfy its break-even constraint and remain
solvent. As demonstrated in Part III, infra, M-ECPR yields the differential access prices now
advocated by Professor Baumol.
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The existing structure of end-user prices for local
telecommunications is not appropriate as a baseline for ECPR or any
other pro-competitive purpose; it is utterly inconsistent with the
competitive policies of the 1996 Act. Cross-subsidies are common in the
rate structure, and rates depart systematically from pertinent costs. In
these circumstances, the old structure of rates is the wrong baseline for
the pricing of network elements through the application of ECPR.
Indeed, applying ECPR to the existing rate structure would result in
component prices that lock in the [incumbent local exchange carrier's]
monopoly profits and inefficiencies, would attract inefficient entry where
rates are too high, and would preclude efficient entry where rates are too
low. ECPR was never intended to (and cannot) substitute for competition
for the monopoly network elements, or limit to fully competitive levels
the prices paid by end users for services that use those network elements.
Of course, as unbundling proceeds and competition spreads as a
result of economic-cost-based pricing of network elements, end-user
prices should be driven toward incremental costs. With the appropriate
end-user prices at incremental costs, the component prices dictated by
ECPR are no higher than [total service long run incremental cost]. 23
On the basis of this argument, Professor Baumol concluded that "the
appropriate forward-looking benchmark for pricing is total service long
run incremental cost, or TSLRIC. ' ' 4
Following comments filed in response to the NOPR, the Commission
released its First Report and Order on August 8, 1996.25 In the order, the
Commission concluded that ECPR pricing should not be used to establish
rates for unbundled network elements: "ECPR is an improper method for
setting prices of interconnection and unbundled network elements because
the existing retail prices that would be used to compute incremental
opportunity costs under ECPR are not cost-based. 26 There is some
evidence that Professor Baumol's affidavit was influential with the
Commission, since his affidavit advanced this same argument while the
FCC's earlier NOPR did not.27
23 Affidavit of William J. Baumol, Janusz A. Ordover, and Robert D. Willig 22-24, at 8-
9, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11
F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) (No. 96-98).
24 Id. 3, at 2. Professor Baumol further concluded that a particular engineering cost model
produced by Hatfield Associates, Inc. "provides good empirical estimates of the TSLRIC of basic
network elements." Id.
25 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, II F.C.C.R. at 15,499 (first
report and order).
26 Id. 709, at 15,859.
27 While the FCC "tentatively conclude[d]" in NOPR "that use of ECPR or equivalent
methodologies to set prices for interconnection and unbundled network elements would be inconsistent
with the . . . requirement that [prices] be based on 'cost,"' NOPR, supra note 19, 148, at 14,222
316
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After the FCC issued its First Report and Order, state public utilities
commissions held arbitration proceedings in accordance with the
requirements of the Act to establish interim prices for unbundled network
elements.28 Collectively, the authors of this Response testified in more
than forty such proceedings and advocated the same ECPR prices that
Professor Baumol now agrees should be charged. However, with a few
exceptions, commissions followed the FCC's lead and adopted uniform
UNE prices based on TELRIC (usually with a modest, uniform markup for
forward-looking common costs), frequently referring to the FCC's position
on ECPR, which in turn cited the affidavit by Professor Baumol.29
It is not surprising that the agencies responsible for implementing
section 252(d)(1) of the Act were influenced by Professor Baumol's
recommendation. After all, Professor Baumol's name is closely associated
with the ECPR pricing methodology, which is also known as the "Baumol-
Willig Rule." Rejection of that rule by a principal advocate was a powerful
argument in favor of uniform TELRIC access prices. Since uniform access
pricing promotes cream skimming (or subsidizes entry), it is also
unsurprising that competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) advocated
this method.30
B. Problems with the Government's Position on Access Pricing
Advocates of TELRIC pricing often assert that firms in competitive
markets are limited to prices that recover forward-looking economic costs.
For example, Professor Baumol argued in his affidavit before the FCC that
"a defensible pricing standard must be based on forward-looking economic
costs, not historic book costs, because the expansion, contraction, entry
(1996), it did not examine the pervasive presence of cross subsidies in pre-Act local telephone rate
structures. The Commission did recognize that the "structure of incumbent LEC rates for
interconnection and unbundled network elements will influence the incentives for interconnectors to
purchase and use these services, independent of the level at which rates are set," but it limited this
discussion of rate structures to separations between shared and dedicated facilities. See generally id.
117-154, at 14,209-24 (discussing "Pricing of Interconnection, Collocation, and Unbundled Network
Elements" and local "Rate Structure").
28 See. e.g., AT&T Communications of the Midwest, Inc., No. C-1400, 1997 WL 1055198,
at *3-*4, *9 (Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 14, 1997); Pricing Proceeding for Interconnection,
Unbundled Elements, Transport and Termination, & Resale, No. UT-960369, 1996 WL 773361, at *1-
*2 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n Nov. 21, 1996).
29 See, e.g., Petition of AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc., for
Arbitration of Interconnection Rates, Terms, and Conditions with GTE Northwest Inc., Pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 252(b), No. ARB 5, slip op. at 12 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n Dec. 12, 1996) (arbitrator's
decision); Petition of AT&T Communications of Pa., Inc. for Arbitration to Establish an
Interconnection Agreement with GTE North, Inc., No. A-310125 F0002, slip op. at 4-5 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n Dec. 5, 1996) (opinion and order).
30 Some of the appeal of uniform TELRIC pricing appears to have been based on the
following result-oriented (and mistaken) syllogism: Many CLECs are better than few CLECs; low
UNE prices encourage CLEC entry; therefore, low, uniform TELRIC prices are desirable.
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and exit decisions of competitors efficiently and necessarily turn on
expected prices and costs and have nothing to do with costs expended
historically or reflected on accounting books." 31 Professor Baumol further
argued that the "measure of costs on which efficient prices are based, and
to which efficient prices converge in competitive markets, is incremental
cost.,
3 2
As we have demonstrated elsewhere, and as recognized by Professor
Baumol in his recent article, any system of uniform access prices imposed
in the presence of retail price discrimination (e.g., cross subsidies) cannot
achieve competitive neutrality.33 In particular, the TELRIC approach
induces entrants to engage in cream-skimming and simultaneously
prevents them from offering service to subsidized customers. Moreover,
TELRIC pricing will not permit an incumbent local exchange carrier
(ILEC) to recover the forward-looking incremental costs on which most
commissions have based their pricing methodologies. These points can be
seen with the aid of Figure One, as shown below. In that figure, an ILEC
offers two services, residential (RI) and business (B1). The retail rates are
not based, however, on forward-looking incremental costs because they
contain cross subsidies. Consequently, the resale rate, which is defined as
the retail rate minus the avoided cost of retailing, also contains a cross
subsidy. Now suppose that CLECs could lease the underlying unbundled
network elements required to provide R 1 and B 1 services at prices equal to
their TELRICs. Uniform TELRIC prices, in combination with
discriminatory resale prices, create an arbitrage opportunity that prevents
the ILEC from recovering its forward-looking incremental costs. The most
profitable route of entry for CLECs is to provide RI service by resale and
to provide BI service through UNEs. Because provision of BI service
through UNEs just covers forward-looking incremental costs and provision
of R1 service through resale fails to cover forward-looking incremental
costs, the ILEC cannot recover its total forward-looking incremental costs.
31 Affidavit of William J. Baumol, Janusz A. Ordover, and Robert D. Willig 3, at 1,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, I 1 F.C.C.R. at 15,499 (No. 96-98).
32 Id. llat 4.
33 See Baumol, supra note 9, at 11.
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FIGURE ONE
Illustration of an ILEC's Inability to Recover its
Total Forward-Looking Incremental Costs
Under TELRIC Pricing$
Resale Price
- - /E TELRIC




Professor Baumol now agrees that if the final-product prices are
discriminatory, then the application of uniform prices to bottleneck
services "will either force the bottleneck owner to end its discriminatory
pricing of the final product, or the market must, in effect, be transformed
into a cartel in which different suppliers specialize in the supply of
different products and do not compete with one another."' 5 In other words,
if a uniform access price is set for a bottleneck service in the presence of
discriminatory retail prices, then either (1) the discrimination in the retail
prices must be eliminated, or (2) the markets must be bifurcated so that
one firm serves customers receiving the discriminatorily low prices
(perhaps with the assistance of a universal service fund to make up any
difference between a subsidized rate and the cost of service), while another
firm serves customers paying discriminatorily high prices. Note that the
status quo is not a possible outcome. That is, setting uniform access prices
in the presence of a discriminatory retail rate structure is not an
equilibrium, because competitors will focus on the more lucrative products
of the regulated firm, which are the products that provide the revenues that
finance the cross subsidies.3 6 That is another way of saying that the
34 That is, if (I) the differences between prices of retail services using a bottleneck service
do not equal (2) the differences between the incremental costs of the non-bottleneck inputs.
35 Baumol, supra note 9, at 12.
36 See id. at 11.
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competitor will have no option but to engage in "cream skimming.",17 Of
course, if the incumbent supplier of the two services had been earning a
fair, competitive rate of return prior to entry, such cream skimming will
thereafter prevent the firm from covering its total costs, contrary to the
purpose of the Act.38
C. Professor Baumol's Suggestion ofDifferential Access Pricing
Differential access pricing solves this cream-skimming problem by
setting the price of the "bottleneck" service to be paid by entrants equal to
(1) the ILEC's resale price minus (2) the incremental cost of remaining
inputs supplied by the ILEC. In practice, the Telecom Act may require
ILECs to provide more than a single element on an unbundled basis to
CLECs.39 If the price of each element were set equal to its TELRIC, a
surcharge could be assessed equal to the difference between (1) the resale
price and (2) the sum of the TELRICs for the UNEs required to provide
that resale service. Notice that in Figure 1 this assessment would result in a
positive surcharge for B1 and a negative surcharge for R1. Such a
surcharge would eliminate the arbitrage opportunity created by uniform
UNE prices and enable the continuation of discriminatory retail rate
structures. 40 This system of surcharges creates competitive neutrality by
eliminating cream-skimming opportunities, while at the same time
facilitating competitive entry into the market for the subsidized services.
The positive surcharge on B 1 to prevent cream skimming, however,
may not be sustainable if applied to UJNEs other than true "bottlenecks."
That is, if CLECs can themselves provide facilities at a cost lower than the
differential UNE price (inclusive of the surcharge), then the surcharge will
not be collected and the ILEC will be unable to recover its forward-
looking incremental cost. In this circumstance, a competitively neutral,
non-bypassable, end-user charge would be required to ensure competitive
neutrality and to enable the ILEC to recover its forward-looking costs.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Michael J. Doane & Michael A. Williams, Competitive Entry into Regulated
Monopoly Services and the Resulting Problem of Stranded Costs, HUME PAPERS ON PUB. POL'Y,
Autumn 1995, at 33, 47 (1995) (explaining that a utility will exit a market if its marginal cost exceeds
the competitive price in that market).
39 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1996). In Iowa
Utilities Board, the Supreme Court vacated the FCC rule requiring ILECs to unbundle specific
elements, holding that the FCC did not adequately consider the "necessary and impair" test set forth in
Section 251(d)(2) of the Act. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S.Ct. 721, 734-36 (1999). The
FCC is promulgating new rules to determine which elements, if any, incumbents are required to
unbundle. See generally Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecoms. Act of
1996, 64 Fed. Reg. 20,238 (1999) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. 1) (proposed Apr. 26, 1999).
40. Of course, rebalancing the retail rates to cost also could eliminate the arbitrage
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In his recent article, Professor Baumol supports the adoption of a
differential access approach with the efficient component pricing
methodology. He argues that:
[ECPR prices are] not very difficult to carry out in practice or for the
regulator to monitor. Nowadays in regulatory arenas, estimates of
incremental costs are provided fairly routinely and appear to be
determinable to a reasonable degree of approximation without enormous
cost or effort .... Thus, if the rule is correct, to calculate the efficient
price of a bottleneck service, one merely needs to observe the final-
product price currently charged by the owner of the bottleneck facility
and subtract from it the pertinent incremental cost.
41
However, as raised by Professor Baumol, there are practical
"shortcomings" that complicate the application of differential access
prices.
42
The first such shortcoming is that the Telecommunications Act may
require ILECs to unbundle more than just a single "bottleneck" element.
Thus, it is necessary to determine the UNEs to which the surcharge (or
surcredit) should be applied. As explained above, no surcharge can be
applied to the many elements (e.g., switching service) provided in
competitive markets. The least elastic network element is the local loop,
although "competitive access providers" have bypassed the loop itself in
many business districts. Thus, a solution to this shortcoming is to assign
the surcharge only to the local loop, which is least likely to be bypassed.
A second shortcoming to the application of differential access pricing
is that the size of the surcharge or surcredit varies with customer usage
levels. For example, in order to be competitively neutral, the loop
surcharge on business customers must be higher on high-volume
customers than on low-volume customers. If a single surcharge were
applied to all business customers, CLECs could profitably cream-skim
customers with above-average monthly bills, while they would be
effectively prevented from serving customers with below-average monthly
bills through the use of UNEs. 43 There are two ways to mitigate this
problem. First, a set of graduated surcharges and surcredits could be
applied to capture most of the variation in customers' usage levels.
Second, a single surcharge and a single surcredit could be calculated based
on the usage levels of average business and residential customers. The
consequent reduction in the recovery of forward-looking costs caused by
41 Baumol, supra note 9, at 8-9.
42 See id. at 17.
43 Of course, efficient CLECs could profitably serve customers with below-average
monthly bills through the use of resale.
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CLEC cream-skimming would be recovered through the use of a
competitively neutral, non-bypassable surcharge.
A final shortcoming is that any system of differential access prices
provides incentives to misreport data. For example, a CLEC leasing a loop
to serve a business customer has an incentive to report that the loop
actually serves a residential customer. Similarly, if a system of graduated
surcharges and surcredits were imposed, CLECs would have an incentive
to report that their loops served low-usage rather than high-usage
customers. These and other similar reporting problems suggest that
practical applications of differential access pricing should be kept simple.
For example, regulators should impose a single surcharge or surcredit
based on the average usage levels of business and residential customers.
Since such a simple system cannot prevent cream-skimming, however, a
competitively neutral and non-bypassable surcharge would accompany the
system of differential access prices to allow the ILEC to cover its forward-
looking costs.
II. The Advantages of the M-ECPR Approach
We have proposed elsewhere an extension of the ECPR, which we
call the Market-Determined ECPR (M-ECPR).44 The M-ECPR differs in
two crucial aspects from the ECPR. First, the additional opportunity cost
used in calculating the access price of a bottleneck service equals the
contribution obtained from the service(s) produced using the monopoly
input, taking into account any price reductions realized in the market. The
maximum M-ECPR price for a bottleneck input, therefore, equals the price
given by standard ECPR, but will be lower whenever competitive entry
constrains the incumbent's ability to recover the level of contribution
embodied in the regulated, pre-entry retail prices of services utilizing that
input.45 The second difference between our proposal and the standard
ECPR is that we supplement it with an end-user charge in order to allow
the incumbent firm to satisfy its break-even constraint and remain
44 See Sibley et al., supra note 17 (discussing the M-ECPR in the context of a retail price
greater than marginal cost). If the initial retail price is less than marginal cost, ECPR and M-ECPR
yield equivalent prices, equal to the retail rate less avoided costs.
45 Returning to the example in note 8, supra, assume again that the ILEC retail rate for
business service is $60, that the incremental cost is $30, and that the cost of other, competitively
supplied inputs is $5. As noted before, ECPR results in an UNE price of $55 for the loop. Suppose
further, however, that a competing provider is efficient and able to provide service to business
customers for only $45 (net of retailing costs). Under M-ECPR, the incumbent's price for an
unbundled loop would also fall to $45. Unless the ILEC responds with a corresponding price
reduction, customers will migrate to the lower-priced competitor, thus diminishing the ability of the
ILEC to recover the level of contribution that had been reflected in pre-entry retail prices. The M-
ECPR thus takes into account the presence of market alternatives.
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solvent.46
For ease of exposition, we will discuss the M-ECPR in a simplified
setting often used in ECPR discussions. Assume that the production of a
retail input requires a bottleneck input produced by a monopolist at a
TELRIC equal to v. Assume also that the bottleneck monopolist is
vertically integrated into the retail market; that there are other inputs
associated with the retailing function that are produced in competitive
input markets; and that the marginal cost of retailing is c to the incumbent.
Suppose an entrant can provide the retailing function in competition with
the bottleneck monopolist at a marginal cost of g but will need to lease the
services of the bottleneck input at a price w from the input monopolist.
Suppose also that the market-determined price for the retail product is P.
In this setting, the two pricing proposals discussed in this paper are
TELRIC pricing (w = v) and ECPR (w = P - c), where P - c is the
opportunity cost to the incumbent of leasing one unit of the bottleneck
input to its retail competitor, and w is constrained to be at least as great as
v. As shown below, the allocative efficiency of each of these rules depends
on the assumed competitive conditions in the retail market.
Price Competition. First, suppose that both firms produce identical
versions of the retail good and that consumers all switch to the firm with
the lower price. If the bottleneck monopolist employs TELRIC and sets w
= v, then the retail price will be the perfectly competitive price at the
monopolist's marginal cost (P = v + c). If the entrant is more efficient than
the incumbent at the retailing function, then it will still set its price at P
while retaining the entire retail market. Now, suppose that the input is
priced according to the M-ECPR, so that w = P - c. Given that consumers
are assumed to switch to the firm with the lower price, P is interpreted to
be the lower of the incumbent's price and the entrant's price. The entrant's
profit when it signs up a customer is now P - g - w, which is equal to c -
g, or the difference between the retail costs of the entrant and the
incumbent. Note that a competitor will find entry profitable if, after paying
the M-ECPR price to the incumbent, its other costs not associated with the
monopoly input (g) are no higher than those of the incumbent. If the
entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the entrant makes a
positive profit on each consumer it attracts. Finally, if the entrant is equally
efficient, we assume that the regulator provides the entrant an arbitrarily
small subsidy per customer for entering. In either case, the entrant makes a
positive profit proportional to the number of customers it serves. In this
setting, the entrant's incentive is to maximize the number of customers
served, which is done by setting P equal to v + c, the incumbent's
46 Continuing the example from the previous note, a competitively neutral end user charge
of$10 would need to be added to the M-ECPR price of $45 in order to prevent arbitrage.
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marginal cost.47 In this type of market, the M-ECPR and TELRIC
approaches yield the same outcome. The results of this computation are
summarized in Table One.
TABLE ONE
A Comparison of TELRIC versus M-ECPR Pricing:
Summary of Results
Firm Behavior Entrant is at Least Entrant is Less
as Efficient as Incumbent Efficient than Incumbent
M-ECPR and TELRIC both result M-ECPR and TELRIC both
Price in an equilibrium retail price equal prevent entry by inefficient
Competition to the incumbent's marginal output competitors.
cost.
M-ECPR results in an equilibrium M-ECPR prevents entry by
retail price equal to the inefficient competitors, while
incumbent's marginal output cost. TELRIC does not. TELRICQuetityn TELRIC results in a retail price leads to lower (higher)
Competition above incumbent's marginal welfare if market demand
output cost. elasticity is sufficiently
inelastic (elastic).
M-ECPR results in lower M-ECPR prevents entry by
equilibrium retail prices for both inefficient competitors, while
Monopolistic the incumbent and entrant than TELRIC does not. TELRIC
Competition TELRIC. leads to lower (higher)
welfare if market demand
elasticity is sufficiently
inelastic (elastic).
Quantity Competition. Now suppose that the retail market does not
lend itself to the perfectly competitive outcome and that some form of non-
price difference exists between the output of the incumbent and the output
of the entrant. One plausible way to model this is to assume that the two
firms are Cournot competitors. In this setting, if the bottleneck input is
priced at TELRIC, the standard result of the Cournot model holds true:
The equilibrium retail price will be above the marginal cost of either
firm. 48 With M-ECPR, however, the entrant's profit per customer is P - g
- w = c - g, so that total profit is simply equal to this quantity times the
47 Recall that w cannot fall below v.
48 See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 209-38 (1989)
(providing an overview of Coumot competition).
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number of customers served by the entrant. Using technical arguments that
are available elsewhere,49 we prove that as long as the entrant is at least as
efficient as the incumbent, the entrant will serve the entire retail market
and will produce to the point where the retail price is equal to the
incumbent's marginal cost, v + c. Because the TELRIC approach yields an
equilibrium price higher than this level, M-ECPR is superior to TELRIC in
terms of allocative efficiency.
Monopolistic Competition. In the cases of price and quantity
competition, it is assumed that the entrant and the incumbent produce
homogenous outputs. Even if we relax this assumption, M-ECPR remains
more desirable than a TELRIC methodology. This case is more
complicated to analyze than the previous cases because the prices of the
differentiated products offered by the incumbent and the entrant will be
different from one another. As a result, there is some ambiguity in
determining the appropriate opportunity cost and defining the M-ECPR.
Without going into a detailed analysis underlying the case of monopolistic
competition (which we provide elsewhere), 50 we summarize that M-ECPR
is still clearly superior to TELRIC-based marginal cost pricing. As long as
the entrant is at least as efficient as the incumbent (g < c), the M-ECPR
approach will yield equilibrium retail prices for both the differentiated
products that are lower than those given by TELRIC pricing. When g > c,
M-ECPR prevents market entry, while a TELRIC approach allows entry
under certain conditions. Whether or not such entry increases or decreases
consumer welfare depends upon a number of factors, including the
elasticity of demand for the retail service, the level of pre- and post-entry
prices in excess of marginal cost, post-entry market shares, and the
magnitude of the entrant's inefficiency.51
In each of the three competitive cases outlined above, whenever the
entrant is at least as efficient as the incumbent, the M-ECPR approach
leads to greater allocative efficiency than does the TELRIC method. When
the entrant is less efficient than the incumbent, there are cases in which
TELRIC pricing is more efficient than the M-ECPR. The reason for this
result is that the M-ECPR makes entry by inefficient competitors
unprofitable, whereas TELRIC allows a less efficient competitor to survive
in either monopolistic or Cournot competition and bid the retail price
down. In this last case, the gain to consumers from entry can outweigh the
increase in resource cost due to the entrant's relative productive
inefficiency if market demand is sufficiently elastic. Assuming that the
49 See Sibley et al., supra note 17, at 7-15.
50 See id. at 15-19. For a discussion of monopolistic competition, see OZ SHY, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 133-67 (1995).
51 See SHY, supra note 50, at 143-62; Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, The
Inefficiency of the ECPR Yet Again: A Reply to Larson, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 431-32 (1998).
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incumbent input monopolist has fixed or shared costs that must be
covered, the equilibrium prices under either M-ECPR or TELRIC pricing
will likely not cover total costs. For this reason, inframarginal costs will
need to be covered with an end-user charge.
Conclusion
We agree with Professor Baumol's analysis of ECPR prices and his
criticism of uniform access prices. We hope that he will continue to make
clear to regulatory agencies throughout the United States and abroad his
rejection of uniform access pricing schemes, such as TELRIC, and his
advocacy of ECPR prices. As Professor Baumol correctly demonstrates
through his "Level Playing Field" theorem, "only by using [ECPR pricing]
can we neutrally price a monopoly-owned bottleneck service required by
both the bottleneck owner and its final product competitors. ' 52
The advantages of the M-ECPR approach are threefold. First, it
allows entrants to compete in every market in which the bottleneck owner
offers retail products, as long as the entrants are at least as efficient as the
incumbent. Thus, the "playing field" will be level. Second, it eliminates
arbitrage ("cream-skimming") opportunities, so that entrants have no
incentive to favor the provision of retail services with relatively high
margins over those with relatively low margins. Finally, it facilitates
efficient entry into all the bottleneck owners' markets, while at the same
time allowing regulators to maintain cross subsidies to further their social
goals, such as universal service. As Professor Baumol summarizes,
regulators "can have their cake. ' 3
52 Baumol, supra note 9, at 6.
53 William J. Baumol, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute, Conference on
Stranded Costs, Deregulatory Takings, and the Regulatory Contract: Legal and Economic Issues
Spanning the Network Industries (Oct. 22, 1998); see also Baumol, supra note 9, at I (describing
differential access pricing to bottleneck inputs as a way to preserve universal-service cross subsidies
while facilitating competitive entry, or as a way to have "your cake").
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